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FISCAL POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE AND EFFICIENCY

Abstract

This paper uses a two-country overlapping generations model to study the
international transmission of fiscal policy among open interdependent
economies under free international capital mobility.

With only lump-sum taxes

and transfers, international transmission involves only pecuniary
externalities: barring dynamic inefficiency, onlydistributi onal issues
("intergeneratio nal and international) are involved.

With age-cspecific taxes

and·transfers, the ability to run deficits'and issue debt does not enhance the
choice set of the governments.

Source-based taxes on the rentals from capital

and residence-based taxes on all property income are also studied.
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FISCAL POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE AND EFFICIENCY
Villem H. Buiter and Kenneth I. Kletzer

1.

INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the transmission of fiscal policy among open

interdependent economies.

In order to be able to evaluate the welfare

consequences of different kinds of international spillovers we derive the
private sector decision rules from explicit microfoundations. The menu of
fiscal actions is restricted to lump-sum taxes and transfers, taxes on the
rentals from capital, and residence-based taxes on all income from asset
ownership.

Governments have to satisfy intertemporal budget constraints or

solvency constraints but can run any sequence of budget deficits or surpluses
consistent with solvency.
The two countries that make up our model world economy are linked through
perfect international mobility of capital. Fiscal actions in one country will
therefore in general affect the other country by changing the common world
rate of interest.

A typical example is the case of a debt-financed increase

in one country's public sector financial deficit raising interest rates world
wide.

The existence of such an international transmission mechanism sometimes

appears to be taken as prima facie evidence of an international fiscal policy
externality.

International coordination of fiscal policies is then proposed

as a way of internalizing this externality.

However, in order to evaluate the

welfare consequences of such spillovers, it is essential to keep in mind the
distinction between pecuniary and technological externalities.
Technological externalities are the indirect effects of a consumption,
production or trading activity on the opportunity sets of other consumers,
producers or traders.

Indirect means that the effect concerns an agent other
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than the one bringing it about and that the effect does not work through the
price mechanism (see Viner [1931], Scitovsky [1954] and Laffont [1987]).
Pecuniary externalities work through the price system and refer to the effects
of producer, consumer or trader activities on the input or output prices of
other producers, consumers or suppliers of factor services.
It is well-known that when all the standard assumptions required for
competitive equilibria to be Pareto optimal are satisfied, pecuniary
externalities have no efficiency implications.

They are merely another word

for general market interdependence. Pecuniary externalities may be associated
with important redistributions of income between agents that have short
positions and agents that have long positions in the commodities whose prices
are altered by some change in private or public behavior. They are therefore
a legitimate welfare concern. The grounds for this concern must however be
distributional.

A prescription for intervention (including international

policy coordination) must be derived from a position on equity and fairness
rather than on the identification of inefficiencies or market failure.
l&en the economy has "preexisting" distortions or when the instruments
the government manipulates in the pursuit of national advantage create
inefficiencies or distortions, an efficiency-based case for coordination may
exist.

Among the preexisting distortions that may make policy transmission

through market prices inefficient are:

distortionary taxes; technological

consumption or production externalities; noncompetitive behavior; incomplete
markets; and Keynesian market failure reflecting insufficient or excessive
effective demand.
Even when markets are competitive, policy-induced distortions are absent
and conventional technological consumption and production externalities are
absent, a role for policy coordination may exist.

As pointed out by Laffont
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[1987], when we move away from competitive equilibria in which all the
assumptions for Pareto optimality are satisfied, market prices may do more
than equate supply and demand and distribute income:
In economies with incomplete contingent markets, prices span the
subspace in which consumption plans can be chosen. In economies
with asymmetric information, prices transmit information. Vb.en
agents affect prices, they affect the welfare of the other agents by
altering their feasible consumption sets or their information
structures. (p. 264)
In such economies the distinction between pecuniary and technological
externalities vanishes because changes in prices do more than create or
destroy rents.

It is possible that the arguments in favor of the coordinated

international management of what are prima facie international pecuniary
fiscal externalities are (implicitly) based on such a non-Walrasian world
view.

It is however surely desirable to bring out explicitly either the

reason(s) for the breakdown of the first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics or the distributional criteria that support the cooperative fiscal
policy prescription.
If demand-deficient Keynesian equilibria are likely to result from
contractionary fiscal policy actions, a prima facie case for policy
intervention, including international coordination of policies, exists.

In a

Keynesian unemployment equilibrium the value of output foregone exceeds the
value of the extra leisure "enjoyed" by the unemployed. This holds even in a
closed economy. In addition, in an open economy, part of any demand
contraction (originating from the public or private sectors) will spill over
to the rest of the world through the deflating country's demand for imports
and supply of exports.

This creates a nonpecuniary externality as the prices

of goods and labor do not measure their marginal social opportunity costs.
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In the rest of this paper the focus is not on Keynesian or other
non-Valrasian equilibrium characterizations of goods markets and labor markets
but on the distributional and efficiency arguments for coordination when many
(or all) of the conditions required for Valrasian equilibria to be efficient
are satisfied. Since stabilization policy is not our concern, our use of a
nonmonetary model represents a considerable gain in simplicity with a
relatively small cost in terms of loss of generality.
The efficient use of policy instruments such as exhaustive public
spending (with or without international externalities) will in general require
international policy coordination (see e.g. Kehoe [1986a, b]). The same holds
for the efficient use of distortionary taxes and transfers (assuming no
lump-sum taxes and transfers are available). The efficient use of lump-sum
taxes and transfers will not in general require international policy
coordination.
In a sequel to this paper (Buiter and Kletzer [1990a]) it is shown that
in the absence of preexisting distortions or distortionary policy instruments
and with unrestricted access to lump-sum taxes and transfers between
generations within each country, policy cooperation is required in order to
achieve a global equilibrium that is not just Pareto efficient with respect to
individual household preferences but also represents a Pareto optimum with
respect to the utilitarian social welfare functions of two national (and
nationalistic) planners.

Cooperation is also required to achieve a restricted

optimum with respect to a utilitarian global social welfare function
reflecting a global planner's international and intergenerational distribution
preferences. This optimum is restricted because international lump-sum
transfers are not permitted.

International transfers (or side payments) are

in general required to achieve the unrestricted global command optimum.
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To put the key issues as concisely and precisely as possible we consider
a two-country overlapping generations (OLG) model.

The OLG model without

operative gift and bequest motives has heterogeneity between the young and the
old. This is essential if the proposition that fiscal coordination is welfare
enhancing is to have a chance when only deficit financing and lump-sum taxes
or transfers are considered. Representative agent models have "first-order"
debt neutrality: holding constant the paths of exhaustive public spending and
of distortionary taxes, transfers, tariffs and subsidies (including monetary
financing), intertemporal redistributions of lump-sum taxes and transfers (and
any associated variations in public sector deficits and debt) that are
consistent with government solvency do not alter the equilibrium of the
economy.
Ve proceed as follows.

This paper focuses on the positive economics of

fiscal policy in open interdependent economies and on the Pareto optimality
(with respect to the individual private utility functions) of the equilibria
generated by a range of fiscal policy actions.

The analysis is restricted to

the case of a nonmonetary economy. The sequel (Buiter and Kletzer [1990a])
studies Nash and cooperative policy behavior in this economy.
In Section 2 of the paper, we introduce a two-country Diamond model
(Diamond [1965, 1970]).

It is a competitive world economy whose private

consumption sectors consist of the two-period Allais-Samuelson OLG model and
whose production technology is given by a neoclassical production function.
There are no distortions or technological externalities. Note that the lack
1
of trading across generations that characterizes OLG models is not in itself
a distortion and a sufficient reason for inefficiency.

Absent other

distortions, any competitive equilibrium in an OLG model with a finite
terminal date (which may be beyond the lifetimes of all generations currently
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alive) is a Pareto optimum. Even if the economy goes on forever, dynamic
inefficiency in only a possibility, not a necessary implication of absence of
unrestricted trading across all generations that have been, are and ever will
be.

It is shown in Buiter and Kletzer [1990a] that a dynamically inefficient

equilibrium cannot occur if national governments have utilitarian (national)
objective functions and have access either to unrestricted age-specific lump
sum taxes and transfers, or to age-independent lump sum taxes and transfers
and unbalanced budget deficits and surpluses. Even if the two (large)
governments play Nash and pursue strictly nationalistic objectives, any
competitive equilibrium with perfect international capital will be dynamically
efficient. The logic is simple: no government will adopt policies that keep
its own interest rate below its growth rate forever.

If the interest rate is

above the growth rate in one country, perfect international capital mobility
(and the assumption of equal growth rates (at any rate in the long run))
ensures that it holds for the whole world economy.
In Section 2 the only taxes are lump-sum taxes (transfers) paid by (to)
the young or the old.

Both the case of age- and generation-specific and age

and generation-independent lump-sum taxes are considered.

The consideration

of arbitrary age-specific taxes and transfers made the Yaari-Blanchard-Veil
OLG model a less attractive vehicle as easy aggregation is lost. 2
Ve consider the effects of policies that increase one nation's public
debt on domestic and foreign interest rates, and capital stocks. Efficiency
and (international and intergenerational) distribution aspects are reviewed.
The consequences of the existence of long-dated debt (with a variable market
price) are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 distortionary taxes (both
source-based and residence-based) and exhaustive public spending are analyzed.
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2.

GOVEB.NIENT BORROVING: THE CASE

or

L1JIP-SUI TAXES

Ve consider the two-country, one-good version of Diamond's [1965]
two-period OLG model used in Buiter [1981] to which we add government
borrowing, lump-sum taxes and transfers and, in later sections, distortionary
taxes.

Home country variables and functions will be unstarred, and foreign

country variables and functions will be starred.
Individuals of the same generation within a country are identical.
Successive generations have the same utility functions.

People live for two

periods, work in the first period of their lives and retire in the second.
There is no intergenerational gift or bequest motive. Labor supply is
inelastic and scaled to unity for each young worker. The home country's
competitive representative individual's optimization problem is given in
equations {1) and (2).

subject to

CJ

(2)

t'

c2 ) 0

t -

The utility function u is twice continuously differentiable, strictly
quasiconcave, and increasing in cJ and c2 • Ve assume that

lim

lim

lim

J
C --+O

2
C --+O

C --+m

J
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The utility of lifetime consumption is maximized subject to the lifetime
budget constraint (2).

The government is assumed not to pursue obviously

infeasible policies, so

Provided w is positive and r is bounded--which will be assured by the labor
market assumptions and the constraints put on the production technology
below--positive solutions will be obtained for c1and c2 •3
The interior first-order conditions for the individual are

(4)

Equations (2) (holding with equality) and (4) can be solved for c1 and c2 .

(5a)

The partial derivatives of these two consumption functions are summarized
in equations (6a-f).

(6a) CJw -

9

(6c) c2w -

1

(6e) CJ
r

-

8(1 act

+ r t+J

) =

[u,,"' -

(c2t + ,,.2t)(1 + rt+1r1<u16} - (1 + rt+1)u,,6}]A-1
"'
"'"'

(6f)c;
where A=

u11 - (1 + rt+t)[2u
12 - (1 + rt+J)u 22]

< 0 by strict quasiconcavity.

If consumption in both periods is a normal good, then
1

>

c!, c;(1 + r)-

1

>

0.

Ve assume this to be the case in what follows.

Output Y is produced by a twice continuously differentiable production
function ~ith constant returns to scale capital l

f' (k) =

.
1
l
k:!
RfT = +

ro

k

~

0

and labor L.
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The labor market and capital rental market are competitive and clear, so

(7)

(8)

The Inada conditions imposed on the production function assume that, provided
the initial capital stock is positive, the capital stock will always be
positive.
The government imposes lump-sum taxes (transfers when negative) on the
young and/or the old, and satisfies its budget identity by borrowing or
lending.

In this section all debt consists of one-period real bonds.

home country government budget identity is Bt+l
In intensive form with b =

f and Lt+l

=

Lt(1

+

= (1+rt)Bt

- r~Lt - r!_ 1Lt-l .
n) this can be rewritten as

(9)

The corresponding equations for the foreign country are, with
self-explanatory notation:

(10)

(11)

* *1 , c~2)
ui(ct
* *1
"2(ct , c~2)

(12a)

ct*1

= c*1(wt* -

=

The

*
1 + rt+1

*1 *2
*
Tt ' Tt ' 1 + rt+1)
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*1 *2
*2 *
c (wt - ,,. t ' 'ft ' 1

(12b)

*2
ct

(13)

wt*

=

*
f *(kt)

(14)

rt*

=

*
f * (kt)

(15)

* (1
bt+l

=

+

*
rt+l)

*
* = w*(kt)
* *I (kt)
ktf

I

+

n*)

=

(1

+

* * - 'ft*1 - ,,.*2
rt)bt
t-1(1

Ve assume perfect international capital mobility.

+

*r 1

n

.

Since the same

commodity is produced at home and abroad (though not necessarily with the same
technology), this implies

(16)

r = r

* •

Because nothing essential hinges on it, we assume that the population growth
rates and the population sizes of the two countries are the same i.e. n = n* ,
and Lt

*

= Lt .

The global capital market equilibrium condition is given by:

or in intensive form

Given the assumptions we made about tastes and technology, a competitive
equilibrium exists in this economy for positive initial capital stocks k 0 and
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k*
0

and bounded initial net external assets

ho = (

c!1 + r! 1)( 1 + ror 1 (1 + nr 1 -

bO - k O •

Competitive equilibria of OLG models can be dynamically inefficient (e.g.
the model can have the property that the interest rate is forever below the
growth rate).

Ve shall focus on equilibria that are not dynamically

inefficient, partly because the empirical evidence seems to suggest this (see
e.g. Abel et al. [1989]), and partly because many of the conventional laws of
economics are suspended when there is dynamic inefficiency and it is hard to
conduct any sensible analysis at all. If the interest rate exceeds the growth
rate, it makes sense to impose the government's solvency constraint given
below.

i

At+i·

IT
[
j=O

=

1
] if i
1 + r t+J·

=1ifi=-1

In intensive form this becomes

~

0
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i

0t+i

(19)

=

rt .]
IJ[/:n
+J
j=O

=1

if i

if i

>0 •

= -1

Similarly, for the rest of the world's governments we have

(20)

In addition to the direct distributional effects of fiscal policy--the
changes in lifetime resources associated with (possibly age- and
generation-specific) changes in lump-sum taxes and transfers at given relative
prices--these tax-transfer policy changes will also in general change relative
prices.

In our one-commodity model the only price is the intertemporal

relative price, the interest discount factor (1

+

rt)- 1 . Redistribution

through changes in endogenous relative prices is therefore limited to
redistribution between net borrowers and net lenders.
Typically, unless second-period transfers are very large (-r 2 is very
large), the young will be net savers or net lenders and the old net dissavers.
The young in period twill therefore benefit from a high value of rt+l (as
well as from a low value of rt which would reflect a high value of the capital
stock kt and therefore a high wage wt)·
Internationally a high saving, low investment country will lend abroad.
Its young will therefore benefit from a higher return on their net foreign
investment (a high value of rt+J for those young in period t).

The higher

rate of interest will, if there are net foreign assets, be at the expense of
the next generation abroad rather than the next generation at home.

In Buiter
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(1981] these issues are considered for two countries with identical production
technologies but different rates of pure time preference.
If the model were extended to include a two- commodity ("our goods" and
"their goods") structure, changes in the terms of trade (a static relative
price) would provide another "endogenous" mechanism for redistribution of
income and welfare.

Net exporters of the home country good would benefit from

an increase in the relative price of home goods.
relative prices can be intimately related.

Atemporal and intertemporal

Uncovered real interest parity

requires that the real interest rate in terms of home goods should equal the
real interest rate in terms of foreign goods plus the expected percentage rate
of change in the relative price of foreign goods.
Vhile for practical policy purposes the endogeneity of the terms of trade
is likely to be important, the methodological message of this paper can be
conveyed almost equally well in a one-good setting.

Occam's razor therefore

leads us to excise the static terms of trade.
Ve now state the first proposition about the competitive equilibrium
characterized by equations (2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19 and 20).

Proposition 1

Given initial values k0 , k*0 , b0 and b0* , any equilibrium for kt , kt* ,
ct1 , ct2 , ct*1 and ct*2 for all t ~ 1 with arbitrary paths of debts (bt and
* and of lump-sum taxes and transfers (rt1 , rt2 , rt*1 and rt)
*2
bt),
can be
replicated without debts and deficits merely by using lump-sum taxes and
transfers.
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Proof
1

2

-

* -*1

- *2

Consider paths bt , rt , rt , bt , rt and rt for all t that support
1 -2 -* -*1 -*2
equilibrium paths kt , ct , ct , kt , ct , ct for all t

~

1 for given k0 ,

k*
O , bO and b*
o·

=

=*

Ve show that for any other set of debt paths bt , bt , t
--1

~

1, there
--2

exists associated paths for lump-sum taxes and transfers Tt ' Tt '
-* -* 1
2
;~ that support the same equilibrium paths kt ,
'kt 'ct
Let

~! , ~!

and

(22a) -

[=1t
T

[=·

-

~!]

=

1
1 + rt+1

l=

1 + rt+l

(22b) - rt J - -rt• J

1

-T2]t

for all t

[=•2t -•2]t

for all t

[=2
Tt

T

-

-

T

Equation (21) ensures that the global capital market equilibrium
condition (17) will be satisfied for the same values of c! , c!, kt and k~
*
(and therefore also the same values of wt and wt).
Equation (22a) ensures
that the home country private sector budget constraint will be satisfied for
the same values of c! , c!, wt and rt+l . Equation (22b) ensures the same
*1
*2
*
for ct
ct , wt and rt+l .
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Substituting (22a) into the government solvency constraint {18) we get

i.e.

(23a)
In the same manner, after substituting (22b) into the foreign government
solvency constraint (20), we get

(23b)
The sum of these last two expressions is equation {21).
The remaining equilibrium conditions (4, 7, 8, 11, 13 and 14) are also
satisfied. Using (22a, b) it is easily seen that with the new fiscal policy
the initial consumption levels

c and c* are not

only feasible but also

optimal. This is because each generation's wealth is unchanged by the new
policy.

Equilibrium consumption demands and real interest rates therefore

= = =*
bt = 0 for

remain unchanged. To get Proposition 1 we choose bt

all

t > 1. □
Thus any equilibrium with government debt and deficits (or surpluses) can
be replicated by an economy in which the government budgets are balanced
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period-by-period (and the stocks of debt are zero) by an appropriate choice of
age- and generation-specific lump-sum taxes and transfers.
Proposition 1 is a generalization of the well-known proposition that an
equilibrium with positive public debt financed by taxes on the young is
equivalent to a balanced budget, pay-as-you-go (or unfunded) social security
retirement scheme in which lump-sum taxes on the young are paid out as
lump-sum transfers to the old. Proposition 2 is an open-economy
generalization of a point made by Calvo and Obstfeld [1988a, b] providing the
converse of Proposition 1.

Proposition 2

c!,

Given initial values k0 and k;, any equilibrium for kt , k~ , c{ ,
1
2
c~ and c~ for all t ~ 1 with zero public debt (and with public sector

deficits balanced country-by- country), and age-dependent lump-sum taxes
and transfers can be replicated with age-independent lump-sum taxes and
transfers, and time-varying public debt and deficits.

Proof

Let variables with single overbars represent the balanced-budget case
with age-dependent taxes and transfers and variables with double overbars the
Note that bt

age-independent tax/transfer case with unbalanced taxes.
-1

all t

~

-1-2

+

n)

rt- 1 , rt

(17), it follows that

(24)

-*1

-1-*2

=2

=1

=*2

=*1

-*

bt

=

and rt- 1 = rt for
1. From the two government budget identities (9 and 15) and equation

= - (1

0 , rt

=

=

=*

bt+1 + bt+1 =

=- (1

+ n)

rt- 1 , rt- 1

= rt
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Equation (24) has to hold for all
=

bt , b: , r~

and

r:

1

for all

t

=

including bt

= bt+l = r~ = 0. This can only be true if (24) holds

country-by-country i.e.

(25a)

and

(25b)
=

=*

Note that b and b are per capita debt stocks and that rt is the real
interest rate, not the real interest rate net of the rate of population
growth.

Per capita world public debt is likely to zigzag from a positive

value in one period to a negative value in the next.

. constant
I f -1
rt+ -*
rt 1 1s

over time, the sawtooth pattern of the public debt (explosive if r > 0)
signaled in Calvo and Obstfeld [1988b] is immediately apparent.
For the private budget sets to remain unchanged at unchanged interest
rates and wage rates it must be true (from (22a, 22b) and the characterization
of the two regimes) that:

(26a)

and

(26b)

1

1
=1
Tt +1
+ rt+1

= -

=1 -1
1 + n -1
Tt + Tt - 1 + rt+1 Tt +1

19

Consider the home country. At a given rate of interest the unfunded
balanced budget social security scheme increases the present discounted value
of lifetime resources of the generation born in period t by
-1
1 + n -1
-rt+
1 + r t+1 rt+l . Vithout loss of generality, think of the change in the

present value of lifetime resources as positive. To achieve the same increase
in lifetime resources of the t th generation with the alternative scheme under
which the tax on or transfer to both generations alive during any given period
must be the same, requires that equation (26a) should hold.

If

positive, that is generation t paid a tax when young, then

ri+l

ri

was

must be

negative. The transfer received by old and young alike in period t+1 must be
equal in present discounted value to the tax paid by generation t when young
-l
· 1++rt+l
n -l
1 -rt+
Pus
rt+l . Th e homogeneous part of t he tax equation changes
1

sign each period and grows at a proportional rate 1

+

r in absolute value.

From the home country government budget identity we have
=

(27)

=

2 + n =1
7
1 + n
t

Adding (27) and its foreign counterpart, and using equations (26a, band 17),
it is easily seen how the sawtooth pattern of taxes is transmitted to a
sawtooth pattern for the world stock of public debt.
One way of approaching the solvency issue is to solve equation (24) (or
the individual governments' equations (25a, b)) forward in time.

Provided we

impose the terminal condition given in (29), this yields equation (28).
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It is, however, hard to interpret (28) and (29) in terms of the usual
"no-Ponzi game" condition requiring that the discounted value of the terminal
debt be nonpositive in the limit. Per capita debt in (29) is discounted using
real interest rates, not real interest rates net of real growth rates, and the
discount factor changes sign each period. A more direct approach is the
following.

Consider the home country government.

Its conventional solvency

constraint is obtained by solving the single period budget identity forward in
time as in (30) below.

T-1 [ T•1

(30)

L

1,

l+n

+

i=O

The conventional solvency constraint is lim o1_1b 1
T-1ro

~

0.

This condition

will not in general be satisfied under the age-independent tax-transfer
scheme. While the per capita debt stock under the age-independent
tax-transfer scheme

b will

zigzag explosively from period-to-period even if

r1

is constant (see equation (24)), per capita debt over a two-period interval
will tend to be well-behaved whenever the net intergenerational transfer under
the balanced budget unfunded social security retirement scheme is
well-behaved. From the home country government budget identity under the
age-independent tax-transfer scheme in (27) it follows that
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Using this expression and (26a) it follows that

(1 + n)r!+l - (1 + r t+l)r! is the value (in period t+1) of the net

lifetime resources transferred to a member of generation t by the balanced
budget social security retirement scheme.

=

Solving (31) forward in time we get

T

(2

+

n)

(1 + n)

~0
[<1
2 kJ t+1+2i

+

. 0

r:;:1t+1+2i -

n

i=

=

The natural solvency condition for this model is that for each t we have
=

(33) lim ot+2T+1bt+2(T+1) < 0.
T-+m

Our proposed solvency criterion is therefore the following.

Consider the

sequence {o 1_ 1 b1}T=O. Even if this is not a convergent sequence, we will
call the home country government solvent if the sequence possesses a
convergent infinite subsequence {o 1 __ 1 b1 _}f.=O such that the limit, as j goes
J

J J

to infinity of o1 __ 1 b1 _, is nonpositive. There clearly exist sequences of
J

J

balanced-budget unfunded social security retirement schemes
this solvency constraint is satisfied.

{r!}~=O for which
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Ve conclude that all equilibria supported by unfunded lump-sum,
balanced-budget social security schemes that satisfy {33) can be replicated
with age-independent lump-sum taxes and transfers, and endogenous public debt
and deficits 5 .o
Proposition 1 states that public debt and deficits are redundant policy
instruments as long as the policy authority has age-specific lump-sum taxes
and transfers.

Proposition 2 emphasizes that an authority without access to

age-specific lump-sum taxes can use public debt and deficits as perfect
substitutes for the missing age-specific taxes and transfers.
To simplify notation and analysis somewhat we specialize in what follows
the private utility functions to the time-additive form given below.
2
1
"'t = u(ct , ct) = v(c{)

lim v'(ci) = lim
Ci-+m
Ci-+O

+

1

v'(ci)

Pv(c!)

=

'

+ m ,

v' > 0

v'' < 0

i

=

1, 2

and with similar Inada conditions
*2 .
*1
P*v*(ct)
v*(ct)+

(1 - P)ff 1 and {1 - p*)p*-l are the domestic and foreign private rates of time
preference; 0 < P, p* .
This yields the home country consumption functions
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with

1 (J + rt+1)
C =
(1 + 6)
w
CJ

T2

=

2
V

''( 2)~-1
Ct

1
1
1 + rt+1 cw

c2 = (1 + rt+J) (1 w
c2
T2

2
C
r
-

=

- (1 -

c!)

c!)

2

= -

2

1 Ct+ Tt
(1 + rt 1 ) C + ~1 - - +
r
+ r t+J

1
A= v''(ct)

+

( 1 + rt+1)

1

+

6

2

,, 2
v (ct)< 0.

Exactly analogous expressions can be found for the foreign country.
The following proposition shows that national age-dependent lump-sum
tax/transfers which need not be coordinated can be chosen to support Pareto
optimal equilibria in our economy.
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Proposition 3

A Pareto optimal plan can be attained as a competitive equilibrium
allocation under free capital mobility and unfunded national social
security schemes. Coordination of the latter is unnecessary.

Proof

This proposition can be argued by noting the necessary conditions for the
global Pareto problem with the Lagrangean given below.
m

positive weights with

L

At and At* are strictly

m

Ai < +

i=-1

m

and

L A: <

+ m ,

and flt is the Lagrange

i=-1

multiplier on the global resource constraint in period t.

The first-order conditions are
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These conditions include the necessary conditions for a competitive
equilibrium

(34a)

(34b)

(34c)

along with restrictions ensuring dynamic efficiency on {Vt} , ft~ 0 for all

t , and Lim ft~ 0 and Lim ftkt = Lim ftkt* = 0. Note that for this to hold
t-+m
t-+m
t-+m
* * < 1 which is
in steady state, it is sufficient that lim AtfAt-J = Lim AtfAt-J
t-+m
t-+m
satisfied if the Pareto weights At and At* are exponentially declining.
As Calvo and Obstfeld [1988] point out, the household budget constraints
given in equations (2) and (10) along with equations (34a, b, c) imply that
only the net discounted subsidy/tax to the household is needed to influence
its behavior. Vith separate national balanced-budget, age-dependent transfer
schemes, each government has one instrument rt2 and rt*2 for one target kt+J
* (or equivalently home country and foreign country saving by the
and kt+J
young) respectively. Vith free capital mobility equation (34c) holds, and
further it ensures that independent fiscal policies using only lump-sum
transfers

suffice. □
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Note that for arbitrary lump-sum taxes a competitive equilibrium under
free capital mobility need not satisfy the conditions for dynamic efficiency,
but there exist national lump-sum tax policies that will ensure dynamic
efficiency.
The short-run effect of domestic or foreign government policies leading
to larger public debts can be inferred from equations (35a, b).

*
Solving from (35b) for kt+J
as a function of kt+J we get

(36)

{' =

t;_ > 0.
f

II

Substituting (36) into (35a) we obtain a first-order (nonlinear) difference
equation ink.

A linear approximation at a stationary equilibrium k , b ,
0
0
*
1 *1
2
*2
bo' To, To 'To and To yields
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(37) kt+1

fl

=

rh f" [(c! - 1)kt + (/; -

1);(kt) - (bt + b~)]

i::: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _w
________

f 11

1

1 + ~ + --

f

11

1 + n

(c 1 + C*1 ) f
r
r

(kt - ko)

11

Local stability requires that

(38)

Note that normality of consumption when young (0 <

c!, c*;w < 1) and a

nonnegative effect of a higher interest rate on saving by the young

(c~, c;1 ~

0) do not suffice to ensure local stability.

A nonnegative

interest rate responsiveness of saving by the young is sufficient to ensure
that fl is positive. This permits us to obtain the short-run effects of
changes in initial conditions and in policy on the capital stocks in the two
countries, and thus on the rate of interest.
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Provided n > 0, we have
akt+J

(39)

~

<0

abt
akt+J
~

art

akt+1

~

akt+J

akt+J

art

>0

akt+J

--;:-y- > 0

--;;-r > 0 and
art-1

>0

art

~

>0 •

ar t-1

* increases, and rt+J decreases whenever kt+J increases.
Note that kt+J

Higher truces in either country in period t on_the old or young reduce the
interest rate, and boost next period's domestic and foreign capital stocks.
The anticipation by the young in period t of higher truces next period also
reduces their consumption, boosts the next period's capital stocks and lowers
the interest rate.

Higher initial stocks of domestic or foreign public debt

lower the capital stocks and raise the interest rate.
The unanticipated introduction in period t of a one unit per capita true
increase on the young with the proceeds transferred to the old in the same
country boosts aggregate consumption and lowers the world capital stock, since
C

-

1

fl(~+ n) < 0 (the pleasantly surprised t-1 generation has a shorter remaining

life span than the unpleasantly surprised t generation).
If following the unanticipated introduction of this scheme in period t
the young expect the next generation to provide for them in the same manner,
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the negative effect on the capital stock in period t+J (equal to

n(11

+

n)

[c 1w( r+-rn)

]
- 1 ) is of course reinforced.

1
Direct international redistribution using lump-sum transfers is discussed

in Buiter and Kletzer [1990a].

It should be clear however that the positive

economics of direct lump-sum international redistribution are straightforward.
Consider for concreteness redistribution from the young in the foreign country
to the young in the home country.

At a given world rate of interest this will

raise (lower) next period's global capital stock if the marginal propensity to
save in the home country exceeds that in the foreign country (if c~ < c:1).
If, say, the global capital stock increases, the associated reduction in the
world rate of interest will cause further (indirect) international
redistribution from net lenders to net borrowers. Therefore in addition to
the direct redistributional effect of the lump-sum international transfer, the
change it causes in the intertemporal relative price will further redistribute
income among the young and the old, within and between the two countries.
the case of a reduction in the rate of interest in period t+J this
redistribution will typically be from those old in period t+J to the young.
In steady state, the two-country equilibrium is given by
(b + b* + k + k*) (1 + n) = w(k) - r 1- c1 [ w(k) - r 1 , r 2 , (1 +

*1 [ w*(k *)

C

2
(n - f'(k))b = -r - l : n
1

(n - f *'(k *) ) b* =

*1

-T

T

*2

- T+n

-

f' (k)) ]

In
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with
k* = e(k)

and

r

* .
= f'(k) = f *'(k)

. imp
. 1·1edb y
Note tat
h one of b, T1 and T2 and one of b* , T*J and T*2 1s

the others. Vithout loss of generality we treat T1 , T2 , T*J and T* 2 as
exogenous policy instruments, and band b* as endogenous.
The effect of changes in T1 , T*J , T2 and T* 2 on k (with band b*
endogenous) is given by equation (40) if n Ir . 6
1

1 ] dT + A- 1 [T+n
1
*1 - J) + _1_]
(40) dk = A- 1 [ 1 +1 n (cw1 - 1) + 'n"=""r
(cw*
n _ r dT

1

1 +

[r+r cw

1 ]dT

'n"=""r

2

+

1

A+

*1

1
2
*1
1 ] d/
1
n [T+'r C * + 'n"=""r
w

where

If the model is locally stable (see equation (38)), then A> 0.
An increase in the scale of an unfunded social security retirement scheme

(e.g. an increase in T 1 and a reduction in T2 by (1 + n) times the increase in
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r 1 ) will lower the steady-state capital stocks at home and abroad, and raise
the world rate of interest 7 if the economy is not dynamically inefficient.

From equations (37 and 38) we can determine the precise nature of the
pecuniary externalities that the government of a country can impose on the
other country in the short run.

Equation (40) provides the same information

for the long run.

3.

LONG- DATED GOVEB.NIENT DEBT

Ve now analyze how our model changes when long-dated public debt and the
associated possibility of capital losses and capital gains are added to the
model. To illustrate, we add to the one-period bonds in the model consols or
perpetuities i.e. financial claims paying a fixed coupon (scaled to one unit
of output) each period from now till kingdom come. Let Pt be the "ex
dividend" or ex-coupon price of a home country government consol and Pt* the
price of a foreign government consol. ~ denotes the stock of home government
consols at the beginning of period t and B~L the stock of foreign government
consols. B8 and B*8 denote the domestic and foreign government stocks of
one-period debt respectively.
Since capital markets are efficient and there is no sovereign risk, we
*
have Pt= Pt , and
1
Pt

Pt+1 - Pt
Pt
-

-+-----r

8
t+1

Ex ante all assets earn the same expected rate of return. Domestic and
foreign private investors are indifferent between holding domestic or foreign,
short or long government debt.
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The home country government budget identity becomes

Ruling out speculative asset bubbles, 9 the period t price of the consol is

CD

(41)

Pt=

i

II
L
i=1 i=1

1
1 + rt .
+J

Does the existence of long-dated debt provide the home country
authorities with additional means to tax or expropriate domestic or foreign
residents that is does it provide additional instruments of policy that were
unavailable when there was only short debt and age- and generation-specific
lump-sum taxes?
Since the old ow all financial wealth, they are the only ones that will
be affected in any given period by any "news" causing asset prices that period
to be different from what they were expected to be.
Consider the budget constraints of the old in period t
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a1 is the share of total

"outside" long bonds (issued by the home and foreign

governments) held in period t by the old in the home country;

a~

is the share

of the total stock of home and foreign short government bonds held by the home
country old, atk the share of the home country capital stock and ak* the share
of the foreign capital stock held by the home country old.

-I,

-

Rt and B~ are the

amounts of private long debt and private short debt respectively owed by the
home country old and owed by the foreign old (the "inside" debt).
The short rate rt is a bygone by the time period t arrives because rt=

!'(kt), and kt is predetermined in period t. The price of long debt Pt
however is nonpredetermined. From equation (41) it is a function of all
expected future one-period rates of return, and through them of current
expectations of all future taxes and transfers imposed by the domestic and
foreign governments.
Note that in a model with only single-period debt the government of a
country (say the home country) can, through unanticipated variations in taxes
on (transfers to) its ow old, reproduce any effect on the resources available
to the old in that country that can be achieved through unexpected capital
gains or losses on long debt.

Let

Bt-J

be the expectation operator

conditional on information available at t-1.

Variables with a single overbar

refer to a situation without long-dated bonds and variables with a double
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overbar to a situation with long-dated bonds. By choosing an unexpected
change in

r!_ 1 of the magnitude given in (43),

the ability to achieve

unexpected variations in the value of long-dated debt can be seen to be a
redundant instrument for a government interested only in influencing the
opportunity set of its own old citizens.

Since in the current setup the government of a country is assumed not to
have any formal powers to tax citizens of the other country, 10 the ability to
influence the price of long-dated debt through its current and/or anticipated
future policy actions does give the government a direct handle to influence
the resource constraint faced by the old in the other country. With only
one-period debt this channel of influence is absent.

By influencing the

resource constraint faced by the foreign old (with nationalistic governments
this would typically involve imposing an unexpected capital loss on the
foreign old that is an unexpected fall in Pt when (1 -

at)[nt

+

B~L] -

nt

> 0)

the amount of resources available to the young in both countries will be
altered (increased in the example just given). Any undesired effects on the
own old of the unexpected change in Pt can be neutralized by a matching
unexpected change in

r!_ 1

•

To interpret this finding the following points should be recognized.
First, only through unexpected capital gains or losses on long bonds can a
government obtain an additional instrument to influence the resources
available to the current old in the rest of the world.

If history is just the
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unfolding of a preordained policy scenario without any surprises, the
dynamically efficient equilibria in an economy with only short debt are
equivalent to those in an economy with long debt.

In this economy without

exogenous uncertainty, any time-consistent equilibrium with rational
expectations and more generally any rational expectations equilibrium with
policy instrument values determined by credible policy rules will not be
11
characterized by long debt price surprises or tax surprises.
Second, even if there is no public sector long debt outstanding, private
agents could have large gross positions in long maturity assets

(B~ > 0 in

equations (42a, b)). Without uncertainty and risk aversion, equalization of
expected rates of return does not suffice to determine individual private
agent holdings of individual assets.

For example an equilibrium with zero

stocks of public debt in both countries and with no net international asset
position for either country is consistent with, say, the home country private
sector owning long claims on the foreign private sector and owing short
liabilities to same (Pt~=

-8~

>

0). To determine the consequences of policy

actions (current or anticipated) that drive up the yield on long bonds, one
must know the global distribution of long assets and liabilities, private and
public. Just considering foreign holdings of long home country public debt
does not in general provide enough information to determine the costs and
benefits of policies aimed at (unexpectedly) changing long bond prices.
Finally, the introduction of long-dated debt does not affect the results_
concerning the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria with perfect
international capital mobility under different lump-sum tax and transfer
schemes.

If the government actions causing capital gains or losses are

anticipated, asset prices will adjust to equate expected rates of return.

If
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they are unanticipated, the resulting price changes are nondistortionary
capital levies or subsidies.

4.

DISTORTIONARY TAXES AND Eill!USTIVE PUBLIC SPENDING
In this section we consider briefly the positive economic consequences of

two kinds of distortionary taxes and of public spending on goods and services.

4.1

Nondiscri•inatory Source-Based Taxation of Capital Inco•e

Consider the imposition by the home country government of a proportional
tax on the income from domestic capital. The tax is nondiscriminatory in that
the same tax rate O < 1 is applied to the rental income from all physical
capital located within the national boundaries regardless of whether it is
owned by domestic or foreign residents. The foreign country similarly imposes
a nondiscriminatory proportional tax rate O* < 1 on the rental income from all
physical capital located within its national boundaries. The only equations
of our model that are affected by these changes are the arbitrage conditions
relating the interest rate to the returns on capital and the two government
gt and gt* denote respectively home country and foreign

budget identities.

country exhaustive public spending in period t per member of generation t.

(44a)

rt

(44b)

* *'(kt)
*
rt= (1 - Ot)f

(45a)

1
9t - Tt -

(45b)

*1
-1 *2
* * *I (kt)
* + rtbt*
9t* - Tt - (1 + n) Tt- l - 0tktf

= (1

- Ot)f'(kt)

(1 + nrl T2t- l -

Otktf'(kt) + rtbt

= (1

+ n)bt+l - bt

= (1

* - bt*
+ n)bt+l
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In the presence of distortionary taxes and in the absence of lump-sum
taxes and transfers, optimal budgetary policy will in general involve
unbalanced government deficits even in models with "first-order" debt
neutrality such as representative agent models.

Given the need for nonzero

public sector revenues, tax smoothing considerations may make it desirable to
spread the unavoidable excess burden of distortionary taxes over time so as to
minimize its total impact on a utilitarian social welfare function.

However,

since nondistortionary taxes and transfers are still available in our model,
any desired smoothing of distortionary taxes can be achieved with continuously
balanced national budgets by varying the time paths of lump-sum taxes and
transfers.
Vith balanced national budgets (45a) and (45b) become

(46b)

In what follows we shall take gt ,

r{

and Ot as exogenous with

r!_ 1 adjusting

endogenously to satisfy the home country balanced-budget condition {46a).
the same way

g~ ,

satisfy (46b).

In

r~ 1 and 0~ will be taken as exogenous with r~!1 adjusting to

Government exhaustive spending is assumed to be public

consumption that enters into private utility functions in an additively
separable manner.

It will therefore only affect private behavior through the

private budget constraints.
Possible reasons for the use of distortionary taxes despite the presence
of lump-sum taxes are discussed at greater length in Buiter and Kletzer
[1990a].

They include additional leverage over the world rate of interest and
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the domestic stock of capital, and the scope offered for taxing foreign
residents if foreigners own part of the domestic capital stock.
Vith nondiscriminatory source-based taxation of capital income, the

aftertax rates of return on capital located in the home country and capital
located in the foreign country will be equalized if there is perfect
international financial capital mobility. The beforetax rates of return will
differ unless the same proportional tax rate is levied in both countries

(0

= 0*).

* there is still (unless O = 0*
Even if O = 0,

= 0)

a wedge between

the world-wide private rate of return to saving rand the social rate of
return to capital formation f' = f *'
Equation (47) gives kt* as a function of kt , Ot and Ot* .

(47)

with

ek = u -

o)( 1 - o* r 1

t:>o
f
II

eo = - (1 - o*r 1 -f>0
f
II

*

c1 -

o*r 1 L:- < o .
f

II

From the global capital market equilibrium condition and the two
consumption functions given below, the impact effects on the capital stocks
and thus on the interest rate of changes in O, 0* , g and g* can be
determined.
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This yields:

(48)

1
II
*1 * *
*
{ (1 + n) [ 1 + ek - c i'U' + kf ) - c *20 (f ' + k f *")ek]
r
r

e - *1r*2k*f *

+ {- ( 1 + n) [ O*

C

+ c* 11*, - c1 (1 - 0*)1*,,t

r

r

I

~o*

-

*1*20*(f*I + k*f * I

C

r

}do*

t+l .

I)

e0*]
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If we evaluate all these impact multipliers at O = 0*
are unambiguous.

= 0, the results

Consider first an increase in public spending, Bt+l . The

expression in equation (48) represents the case where the increase in Bt+l is
anticipated in period t. As regards its impact on private saving by the young

r!.

in period t, this is equivalent to an anticipated increase in
The result
* . The world
is an increase in saving and larger values of kt+l and kt+l
interest rate in period t+1 falls.

If the increase in 9t+l is ·unexpected,

there is of course no effect on kt+l as saving by the young in period twill
* also raises
not have been influenced by it. An anticipated increase in Bt+l

the two capital stocks in period t+1 and reduces the world rate of interest.
A larger value of Ot+l lowers the domestic capital-labor ratio in period
t+1.

The well-known result of Diamond (1970] that in OLG models an increase

in the rate of capital income taxation may lower the capital-labor ratio to
such an extent that the aftertax marginal product of capital and thus the
interest rate actually rise can occur in the two-country model as well.

Note

that it can happen even if the home country capital income tax is the only
distortion in the economy and if the (infinitesimal) change in O is evaluated
at O = 0 •
*
The effect of an increase in Ot+l on kt+l
is ambiguous. Given kt+l , a
* . The reduction in kt+l as a
larger value of Ot+l implies an increase in kt+l
* .
result of the increase in Ot+l will have the effect of lowering kt+l

* declines unambiguously as the
The total world capital stock kt+l + kt+l
*
result of an increase in Ot+l (or in Ot+l)
if the home country and the foreign

country are identical. At the initial capital stock, the higher tax rate on.
capital income means a lower aftertax return on physical capital and therefore
a lower interest rate. This we assume will reduce saving by the young
(c~ <

0). In addition the higher tax rate on home country capital income
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means that lump-sum taxes on the home country old will be reduced.

Given our

assumption of normal consumption in both periods, this too reduces saving by
the young who anticipate the future tax cut. Another way of looking at it is
that the increase in Ot+J and the reduction in r! have (because they represent
balanced-budget operations) offsetting "income effects." That leaves just the
substitution effect of the lower aftertax rate of return on capital associated
with a higher value of Ot+J which depresses saving.
* 0
Qualitatively the steady-state effects of permanent changes in g, g,

and O* are the same as the impact effects, provided the model is locally
stable.
The effects of nondiscriminatory source-based taxation of, say, domestic
capital income on the relative stocks of domestic and foreign capital, and on
wages in period t+1 and beyond are not surprising.

Such taxes (or subsidies)

are often introduced or manipulated precisely because of their expected
effects on fixed capital formation.

It is important to note however that in

general equilibrium such capital taxes will also affect private saving, both
because they affect the interest rate and because the change in these taxes
may alter the lifetime budget constraints faced by different generations.
Unless Diamond's OLG paradox occurs, higher capital taxation will reduce the
interest rate.

In our model with lump-sum taxation on the old assigned the

role of passive residual adjusting to balance the public sector budget, higher
capital taxes will at a given interest rate tend to reduce saving by the
young.

If alternative budgetary rules are specified (say, with r{+J or gt+J

adjusting to balance the government budget), different results will obtain.
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4.2 Residence-Based Taxation of All Asset Incoae
The polar opposite of nondiscriminatory source-based taxation of capital
income is the application by a nation of an equal proportional tax rate to all
nonwage income earned by its residents, regardless of whether the assets that
are the source of the income are located at home or abroad.

Let O now denote
the home country's tax rate on its residents' asset income and O* the foreign
country's tax rate on the asset income of its residents. r is the riskless
one-period interest rate on home country debt and r* the riskless one-period
interest rate on foreign debt. Vith residence-based taxation of all asset
income and perfect international capital mobility (49a, b) hold.
(49a)

f'(k)(l - 0) = f *'(k*)(1 - 0)

(49b)

f' (k) ( 1

* = f *' (k*) ( 1

- 0 )

= r(J

- 0)

* = r (1

- 0 )

= r*(1
*

- 0)

*

*

- 0) = r ( 1 - 0 )

Now it is the beforetax rates of return on investment that are equalized

* =r
globally by perfect international capital mobility: f'(k) = f *'(k)
r* . Vhile there is no distortion in the global allocation of physical

=

capital between countries, there can be distortions both between home country
and foreign private saving, and in global saving and investment.
First, home country private savers face the intertemporal relative price

(1

r(l - 0))-l while foreign private savers face the intertemporal relative
price (1 + r(l - 0)) -1 . Unless O= 0* , these intertemporal relative prices
+

differ for domestic and foreign savers. Second, even if O = 0* but with O =
0* # 0, the common home and foreign intertemporal relative price faced by
savers differs from the common marginal rates of intertemporal transformation
through capital formation (1 + f'(k))- 1 = (1 + f*'(k*))- 1 .
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With residence-based taxation of asset income and balanced government
budgets, equations (50a, b) hold. Exhaustive government spending is omitted.

(50a)

(50b)
Noting again that beforetax marginal products of capital are equalized at
home and abroad, that r(1 - 0) governs the home country private saving
* governs the foreign private saving decision, we
decision and that r(1 - 0)
* on the
can determine the effect of anticipated changes in Ot+J and Ot+J

* • Ve again
interest rate rt+J and the world stock of capital kt+J + kt+J
assume that r! and r~ 2 adjust to maintain budget balance when Ot+J or O~+J are

varied.

If

c~

< 0, a higher asset income tax rate in the home country will

reduce home country private saving at a given capital-labor ratio.

In

addition the higher asset income tax rate means a reduction (anticipated by
the young generation born in period t) in r!. Vith normality this too will
tend to reduce saving by the home country young in period t.

The result is a

*
reduction in kt+J and in kt+J
. The beforetax rate of interest r therefore

rises.

Again the Diamond OLG paradox can occur (even when the distortionary

tax O is the only distortion in the economy and the (infinitesimal) increase
in O is evaluated at O= 0):

the home country aftertax rate of interest can

increase when O is raised. The foreign aftertax rate of interest of course
rises.

If the model is locally stable, the long-run effects of a permanent

increase in Oare in the same direction as the impact effects.
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5.

CONCLUSION

The subject matter of this p~per is the positive economics and Pareto
efficiency of fiscal policy in open interdependent economies. The first three
sections consider the positive economics and welfare economics of the
pecuniary externalities associated with the use of national fiscal policy
instruments in a two-country OLG model. Vithout public goods, technological
externalities or other departures from the conventional competitive ideal
type, interdependence and the transmission of policy shocks (or other
disturbances) are mediated through competitive market clearing prices.
Disregarding the possibility of dynamic inefficiency--which can occur in the
class of competitive OLG models considered in this paper--the equilibria
generated by different lump-sum tax-transfer and borrowing policies in the two
countries will all be Pareto efficient. Because of the assumption of perfect
international capital mobility, national tax-transfer and debt policies will
affect foreign as well as domestic interest rates and capital-labor ratios.
Vhen government debt has a single-period maturity, the ability to run
public sector deficits or surpluses does not enhance the range of equilibria
that can be supported by government policy if governments have access to
unrestricted age-dependent lump-sum taxes and transfers. Vithout age-specific
lump-sum taxes and transfers, the ability to unbalance the public sector
budgets allows governments to support the same equilibria that could be
supported with age-specific lump-sum taxes and transfers. This restatement in
a two-country setting of a result of Calvo and Obstfeld [1988] is true with
longer maturity debt only if time-consistent or other credible policies alone
are considered.
The central role of the world interest rate as a key determinant of the
distribution of the gains from international lending and borrowing in our
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model is shared by the role of the static terms of trade as a key determinant
of the distribution of the gains from static trade in more general models (see
Buiter and Kletzer [1990b]). The analysis also suggests that without a
mechanism for achieving nondistortionary international redistribution, global
social welfare could be enhanced by the use of such distortionary instruments
as taxes on the income from capital, source or residence taxation of foreign
factor income, the subsidization of foreign lending or borrowing etc. Pareto
efficiency would then be sacrificed in the pursuit of social welfare.
In Section 4 of the paper source- and residence-based taxation of capital
income and other asset income is studied together with a brief analysis of the
consequences of variations in exhaustive public spending.
If there are distortions (global public goods, international production
or consumption externalities, noncompetitive market structures etc.), the use
of nonlump-sum tax, transfer and subsidy instruments need not be at the
expense of Pareto efficiency. Ve explore some of these issues further in the
sequel to this paper (Buiter and Kletzer [1990a]) which also contains an
analysis of the welfare economics of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal
policy design.
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NOTES
1rn OLG models with infinite lived agents, all agents alive at time t can
trade with each other and (in due course) with all agents born in periods
beyond t . The Yaari-Blanchard model with a zero death rate is an example of
such a model. The key property of absence of debt neutrality is preserved as
long as the birth rate is positive. Vb.at is required for our analysis is that
the government be able to redistribute resources between heterogeneous agents,
either directly (say through balanced budget tax-transfer schemes) or
indirectly (say through taxes and borrowing). The OLG model provides a
convenient (and plausible) way of introducing the required heterogeneity.
2Examples of the use of the two-period OLG model in two-country models
are Buiter (1981], Buiter and Eaton [1983], Kehoe [1986a], Hamada (1986] and
Sibert [1988]. The Yaari-Blanchard OLG model has been applied to two-country
models in Frenkel and Razin [1987], Obstfeld [1989] and Buiter [1989].
3The conditions on u ensure that equation (2) will hold with equality.
4This is obtained by solving the government's single-period budget
identity forward in time and imposing the terminal conditi~n
. = 0.
l imll t .Bt
i--tm +i + 1+i

5rt is clear that the optimal consumption path under the balanced budget
and age-dependent taxes and transfers remains optimal under age-independent
taxes and transfers and unbalanced budgets.
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61f n = r changes in debt and taxes have no real effects.

7 :kr1

dr 2

1 =
= -

(1

+

n)dr

g· ~ :h(c~ - 1) < 0 if r > n .

8Note that any steady state with a positive price of bonds will have a
positive real interest rate as in steady stater=

j > 0.

With a zero

population growth rate, the substitution of consols for short bonds therefore
would eliminate dynamically inefficient steady states. Since the coupon is
positive (and equal to

1

in our example), the only possibly steady states have
In many OLG models noninterest bearing outside

a constant price of consols.

fiat money is effectively a "zero coupon consol." It will only be held if the
expected proportional rate of capital gains on money is no less than the rate
of return on alternative assets.

With such a zero coupon consol, all steady

states are at the golden rule.
s

1
II[
1 rt+J· ]pt +s = 0.
s-im . 1

9i.e. assuming that lim

+

J=

10Nor can a government make positive transfers to the other country in
our setup.

This assumption is relaxed in Section 4 when the taxation of

capital income permits a government to tax foreign residents if they own home
country capital.
11This credibility may be due to reputation effects, to credible
punishment strategies or other trigger strategies in models of games with
memory or to the presence of a compulsively honest government satisfying the
George Washington maxim ("I cannot tell a lie").
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